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PROSPECTIVE DETERMINATIONS OF DERIVED
USE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: UPSETTING
THE IMMUNITY BALANCE
INTRODUCTION
A tension exists between an individual's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination' and a prosecutor's interest in bringing a
1. U.s. Const. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that "[no person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. Tile fifth
amendment was made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). The principle nemo
tenetur seipsum prodere, no one is bound to betray himself, has its roots in English
common law. M. Berger, Taking the Fifth 1 (1980); L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth
Amendment 42 (1968); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 22950, at 283-84 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961); Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763, 769-74 (1935). The doctrine
developed in reaction to the ex officio oath, an instrument of self-accusation, result-
ing either in torture or death on the one hand, or betrayal of friends and family on
the other. L. Levy, supra, at 42; 8 J. Wigmore, supra, § 2250, at 089-90. The oath
was used frequently against Puritans and other heretics. M. Berger, supra, at 11;
Pittman, supra, at 769-80. Fleeing oppression, these groups brought their hatred of
the oath to the New World. Id. at 775. There they incorporated the privilege against
self-incrimination into colonial judicial systems. L. Levy, supra, at 368; Pittman,
supra, at 775. However, "[t]he history of the privilege does not settle the policy of the
privilege." 8 J. Wigmore, supra, § 2251, at 295; accord M. Berger, supra, at 1;
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. Cin. L. Rev. 671, 679 (1968); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy.
1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 194. The fifth amendment has been called " 'a doctrine
in search of a reason.' " Friendly, supra, at 685 (footnote omitted) (quoting
W. Schaefer, The Suspect and Society 59-60 (1967)). Cases and commentators have
proposed numerous policies in support of the privilege. E.g., Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
55-57 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1964): Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 426-29 (1956), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (18S6):
E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 73 (1955); 8 J. Wigmore, supra, § 22.51,
at 295-318; McKay, supra, at 214. The Court, in Murphy v. Vaterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964), stated that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination 'registers an
important advance in the development of our liberty-"one of the great landmarks in
man's struggle to make himself civilized." " ... It reflects many of our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load,'.. . our respect for the inviolability of the human personal-
ity and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life,'. . . our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that
the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the
innocent.' " Id. at 55 (citations and footnote omitted).
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wrongdoer to justice. 2 This tension has historically been resolved by
prosecutorial grants of immunity that supplant the fifth amendment
privilege. 3 Under the current federal witness immunity statute,4 the
prosecutor has the sole authority 5 to order the district court to issue
2. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966): United States v. First V.
State Bank, 491 F.2d 780, 782-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974):
Friendly, supra note 1, at 680-81. Judge Friendly contends that "the privilege, at
least in its pre-trial application, seriously impedes the state in the most basic of all
tasks, 'to provide for the security of the individual and his property,' not only as
against the individual asserting the privilege but as against others who it has reason to
think were associated with him." Id. at 680 (footnote omitted) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)).
3. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 125 (1980): United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448
(1972); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1956); United States v. First
W. State Bank, 491 F.2d 780, 782 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). For a
history of federal immunity statutes enacted in the United States, see Comment. The
Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional
Tightrope, 72 Yale L.J. 1568, 1571-78 (1963).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). Section 6002 contains the general grant of
immunity, It provides in full: "Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a
proceeding before or ancillary to (1) a court or grandjury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or (3) either House of Congress, a joint commit-
tee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the
person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued
under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information com-
pelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order." Id. § 6002.
5. Id. § 6003(b); e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy),
661 F.2d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11,
1982) (No. 81-825); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644
F.2d 70, 78 n.13 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig.
(Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1980),,cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); In
re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1979); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d
531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); In re Daley, 549 F.2d
469, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d
791, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Section 6003 provides in full: -(a) In the case of any
individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at
any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of
the United States, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the
proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he
refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such
order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part. (b) A United States
attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an order under
subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-(1) the testimony or other
information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
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grants of immunity. 6 Such a grant confers use-derivative use protec-
tion-a bar to the use of any testimony or information derived there-
from in a subsequent prosecution of the witness.- Exercise of the
prosecutor's authority is based upon a determination that the need for
evidence against the accused exceeds the state's interest in allowing the
witness to remain silent by standing on his privilege against self-
incrimination." This "state-individual balance," which lies at the
heart of the fifth amendment privilege,9 has been upset by judicial
interference with the prosecutorial discretionary power.
In recent cases, witnesses who had received immunity for testimony
given before federal grand juries investigating antitrust Niolations'0
were deposed by civil plaintiffs using questions based upon or taken
from the immunized grand jury testimony." The question confront-
ing the courts was whether deposition testimony could be compelled
over the witnesses's fifth amendment claims.12  Some courts have
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination." 18 U.S.C. § 6003
(1976).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1976).
7. Id. § 6002; e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 44344 (1972); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker). 644 F.2d 70, 75-76 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1979).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) (1976): e.g.. United States v. Dunn, 577 F.2d 119,
126 (10th Cir. 1978); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977); see Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
9. Of the numerous policies said to underlie the fifth amendment privilege, the
one that has been given the most credence is that the privilege contributes to a fair
state-individual balance at a criminal trial. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (196"):
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966): Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d
1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982)
(No. 81-825); United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1975); 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2251, at 317; Friendly, supra note 1, at 6S7: Note, Self-
Incrimination and the Likelihood of Prosecution Test, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
671, 673 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Likelihood of Prosecution]. see Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
10. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1147
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-8-5);
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 72-73 (2d
Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086,
1088-89 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d
1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1979).
11. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1147
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey). 620 F.2d 1086, 1089
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981): In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043,
1045 (8th Cir. 1979).
12. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1149
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
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compelled such testimony, reasoning that it is "derived" from immu-
nized information and, therefore, barred from future prosecutorial
use. 13 Other courts have honored the fifth amendment claim based
upon a belief that a court lacks power to define derived use in a civil
setting. 14
This Note examines the scope of a district court's powers with
respect to its determining, in a civil setting, the parameters of a prior
grant of immunity. After weighing the civil litigant's need for infor-
mation against the interests of the witness and the government prose-
cutor, this Note concludes that a district court does not have the
power to make a determination of derived use in a civil proceeding.
Prospective determinations of derived use necessarily undermine the
government's ability to bring subsequent criminal prosecutions against
the witness. Alternatively, the witness's ability to claim the benefits of
his fifth amendment privilege may be imperilled.
[. THE STATE-WITNESS 13ALANCE
A. The Witness's Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
The state commands considerable investigative resources in the
prosecution of criminal violations of its laws.' 5 As a shield against
these powers,16 the fifth amendment provides that a witness 17 may not
be compelled to furnish information that, standing alone, could possi-
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 74-75 (2d
Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086,
1091 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d
1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1979).
13. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 77
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1046-48 (8th Cir. 1979); see Little Rock
School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 705-06 (8th Cir. 1980); Patrick v. United
States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1975).
14. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1153
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1093 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 4,19 U.S. 1102 (1981); see In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
465 F. Supp. 618, 628-29 (N.D. Ill.), vacated per curiarn on other grounds, 609 F.2d
867 (7th Cir. 1979).
15. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 480 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977);
see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 477-78, 481 (1966).
16. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
17. The privilege is a personal one. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371
(1951); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 69 (1906). It may not be claimed by a corporation or similar organization, Bellis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-89 (1974); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
382 (1911); United States v. O'Henry's Film Works, Inc., 598 F.2d 313, 316 (2d Cir.
1979), and it may not be asserted to protect anyone but the witness. Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 91 (1906). Only
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bly subject him to criminal prosecution '8 or "which would furnish a
link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute" him under a crimi-
nal statute.'9 The witness is only protected against the use of self-
incriminating testimony at a criminal proceeding. 20 To effect fully its
protection, however, the privilege may be invoked in any proceeding,
"civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigator), or adjudi-
catory," 2' 1 so long as the testimony sought could subsequently subject
the witness to criminal liability.22
The witness's mere assertion of a fifth amendment claim does not in
itself establish its validity; the trial court determines the legitimacy
and scope of the claim. 23 Accordingly, the court will make a particu-
larized inquiry, deciding in connection with each area that the inter-
the witness may raise the privilege, though his counsel may advise him of its exis-
tence. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1975); Note, Persons Entitled to
Waive or Claim Privileges as to the Admission of Testimony, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 686,
691-92 (1930).
18. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951); United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 700 (5th Cir.
1980) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)); In re Corru-
gated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Tug Kate Malloy, 291 F. Supp.
816, 818 (E.D. La. 1968); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
19. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); accord Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161
(1950); United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Tug Kate Malloy, 291 F. Supp. 816, 818 (E.D. La. 1968); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F.
Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1951); see Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1972). The fifth amendment does not protect
the witness from the use of self-incriminating statements leading to civil liability.
E.g., Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975);
United States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp. 846, 857-58 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Nor does it bar the
use of such testimony in professional disciplinary proceedings. E.g., Segretti v. State
Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 886, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793, 797, 544 P.2d 929, 933 (1976); In re
Schwarz, 51 II. 2d 334, 338, 282 N.E.2d 689, 691, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047
(1972); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 315, 329 A.2d 1, 6
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975). In addition, the privilege does not shield
the claimant from disgrace or social opprobrium. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445
U.S. 115, 125 (1980); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956); Smith v.
United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605 (1896).
21. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (footnote omitted).
22. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); In re
Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
23. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); United States v.
Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 700 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
609 F.2d 867, 871 n.5 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Mahady &
Mahady, 512 F.2d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 1975); Capitol Prods. Corp. v. Hernon, 457
F.2d 541, 542-43 (8th Cir. 1972); see Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965). "The central standard for the privilege's application has been
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rogator wishes to explore whether the claim of privilege is well-
founded. 24  When the court erroneously compels testimony over a
valid fifth amendment claim, an exclusionary rule operates to prevent
the admission of this testimony, or its fruits, against the witness in any
subsequent criminal prosecution. 25  If tainted evidence has formed
the basis of a conviction, the conviction should be vacated.2,
whether the claimant is confronted by a substantial and 'real,* and not merely trifling
or imaginary, hazard of incrimination." Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53
(1968) (citations omitted); accord United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131
(1980); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investig., 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972).
The inquiry is two-pronged: 1) whether the witness's answers might indicate his
participation in criminal activity and 2) whether any answers given subject the
witness to a possibility of criminal prosecution. In re Corrugated Container Anti-
trust Litig. (Franey), 020 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1102 (1981); see In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 871 (7th Cir.
1979) (per curiam); Wehling v, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087
n.5 (5th Cir. 1979). Before it may compel testimony over a fifth amendment claim.
the court must determine that there is not a real possibility of prosecution. Hoffman
v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
374-75 (1951); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086,
1091 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Illinois v. McCulloch, 507
F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974). When, for example, the statute of limitations has run
on the crime to which the witness may be a party and no possibility of prosecution
therefore exists, the witness's claim of privilege is invalid and he may be compelled to
testify. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1958).
24. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951); In re Folding Carton
Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v.
Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1976); see United States v. Goodwin,
625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 741 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); Capitol Prods. Co. v. Hernon, 457
F.2d 541, 542 (8th Cir. 1972). A witness cannot make a blanket claim of privilege.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 100 (1964); Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir.
1980); National Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 615 F.2d 595, 596,
598 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); United States v. Melehor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1976).
Only a defendant in a criminal prosecution can assert the privilege absolutely. 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2268, at 406; cf. United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 368
(9th Cir. 1981) (district court, based on knowledge of the case, may sustain a
witness's blanket claim of privilege if it concludes that the witness could validly
refuse to answer all relevant questions).
25. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976); Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 79 (1973); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78 n.13 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 872 n.11 (7th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); see In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d
1145, 1156-57 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982)
(No. 81-825); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1969). For a brief
discussion of the differing policies underlying the fourth and fifth amendments'
exclusionary rules, see United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1976);
Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82
Yale L.J. 171, 176-78 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Standards for Exclusion].
26. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); United States v. McDan-
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The holder of the privilege may himself abrogate his fifth amend-
ment protection. A witness in any proceeding waives the privilege as
to particular questions by voluntary response to them.2-  Affirmative
acts by the witness are not necessary to waive the privilege; relinquish-
ment of fifth amendment protection is predicated upon any objective
determination of noncompulsion. 28 The subjective intent of the wit-
ness thus does not bear upon a finding of vaiver.29
Ordinarily, immunity removes the danger of inadvertent waiver by
the witness. Because the prosecutor controls both the initial grant of
immunity and the questions posed to the witness, all responses will fall
within the scope of the statutory protection. 30  Enabling the prosecu-
tor to supplant the fifth amendment privilege with an immunity grant
furthers his law enforcement capabilities.
B. The State's Power to Compel Testimony
At common law, the state was entitled to -every man's evi-
dence." 31 This right granted the state unrestricted access to all infor-
iel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 903
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973).
27. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951), United States v. Seifert,
648 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1980); Camelot Group, Ltd. v. \V.A. Krueger Co., 486
F. Supp. 1221, 1229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see In re Master Key Litig., 507 F.2d 292,
294 (9th Cir. 1974). A defendant waives the privilege as to matters made relevant by
his testimony when he takes the stand on his own behalf. Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 157 (1958); United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 907 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2276, at 459-62. Voluntary -[d]isclosure of a
fact waives the privilege as to details." Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373
(1951); accord Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896); In re Corrugated Con-
tainer Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1155 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825); United States v. James, 609
F.2d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980): United States v.
O'Henry's Film Works, Inc., 598 F.2d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1979); Camelot Group, Ltd.
v. W.A. Krueger Co., 486 F. Supp. 1221, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
28. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976); see Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1973); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970);
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
29. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976); Schneekloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1973); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
370-71 (1951).
30. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70,
79 (2d Cir. 1981); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 541 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
31. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972); United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). Jeremy Bentham asked, "Are men of the
first rank and consideration, are men high in office, men whose time is not less
valuable to the public than to themselves-are such men to be forced to quit their
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mation needed in carrying out law enforcement. 32 The fifth amend-
ment, however, severely limits the state's right to this evidence. 3
Recognizing that the privilege against self-incrimination seriously im-
pedes law enforcement efforts, 34 the Supreme Court has consistently
upheld immunity statutes. 35  Because immunity "remove[s] those
[prosecutorial] sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation
of the privilege, ' 36 the witness receiving statutory immunity must
speak. 37 To be constitutionally valid, however, the immunity must at
least be coextensive with the privilege it supplants. 3 Thus, any form
of immunity must continue to provide the witness with a shield
against governmental compulsion of testimony that may expose him to
criminal liability.
In Kastigar v. United States, 39 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of section 6002 of the Witness Immunity Act. 40  This
statute provides for use-derivative use immunity in all federal pro-
business, their functions, and what is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of
every idle or malicious adversary, to dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes,
as far as it is necessary, they and everybody! What if, instead of parties, they were
witnesses? Upon business of other people's, everybody is obliged to attend, and
nobody complains of it. Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury,
and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach while a chimney-
sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples,
and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon
them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly." J. Bentham, 4 The
Works of Jeremy Bentham 320 (Bowring ed. 1843), quoted in 8 J. Wigmore, supra
note 1, § 2192, at 71.
32. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-44 (1972):
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
33. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); In re Bonk, 527 F.2d 120, 124 (7th Cir. 1975): see
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,
331 (1950).
34. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-88 (1972); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365-66
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
36. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956).
37. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956); see Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 184
(1954) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); In re Kelly, 350 F. Supp. 1198, 1205
(E.D. Ark. 1972).
38. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 122-23 (1980); Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 100
(1964) (White, J., concurring); United States v. De Diego, 511 F.2d 818, 822 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
39. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
40. Id. at 462 (upholding Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. II, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 927
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976)).
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ceedings. 41 Prior to the enactment and validation of the immunity
statute, transactional immunity was considered the only form of pro-
tection coextensive with the fifth amendment.4 2  Transactional im-
munity provides a witness with legal absolution for all crimes con-
fessed during testimony. 43  In contrast, under a grant of
use-derivative use immunity, a prosecutor is not prevented from pro-
ceeding against the witness with evidence that is wholly independent
of the immunized information. 44
The defendant or witness may not, as a matter of course, receive
immunity, nor does the prosecutor have a duty to bestow it on a
witness at the defendant's demand. 45 In addition, the court may not
41. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1972), 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1976).
42. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892): see In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 75 n.8 (2d Cir. 1981);
Carlson, Witness Immunity in Modern Trials: Obsercations on the Uniform Rule of
Criminal Procedure, 67 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 131, 132 (1976); ,Measures
Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30, S.974, S.975, S.976, S.1623, S.1624,
S.1861, S.2022, S.2122, and S.2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Ses. 284-85 (1969)
(statement of Rep. Poff) (although use-derivative use immunity may be considered by
some to be unconstitutional in light of the history of transactional immunity, the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws believes it to be constitu-
tional) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892), the first Supreme Court review of an immunity statute, the Court
invalidated an immunity statute because it provided insufficient protection for a
witness compelled to testify under it. Id. at 585-86. The statute provided immunity
from future prosecutorial use of the compelled testimony given in judicial proceed-
ings. Id. at 560. It did not, however, protect against use of its "fruits'-the use of the
immunized testimony to search out leads to other evidence that could be used against
the witness. Id. at 564. The Court concluded that to be constitutionally valid,
statutory immunity "must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offence to which the question relates." Id. at 586. The Counsehnan language was
subsequently dismissed by the Kastigar Court as dictum. Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972). In upholding use-derivative use immunity, the Kastigar
Court followed earlier decisions in which it had given limited approval to use-
derivative use immunity. Id. at 455-59: see Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276
(1968); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). Although federal
statutory immunity grants provide for use-derivative use protection, states are free to
provide transactional immunity at state proceedings. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
50.10 (McKinney 1981). As against federal authority, however, state transactional
immunity provides only use-derivative use protection. Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); United States v. First NV. State Bank, 491 F.2d 780,
785-86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
43. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 452-54 (1972); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896); see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
44. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972); United States v.
Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516
(2d Cir. 1976).
45. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 771-72 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1077 (1981); United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 624 (9th Cir. 1979),
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issue immunity sua sponte46 _ the judicial role is purely ministerial.
Once the witness claims or appears likely to claim his fifth amend-
ment privilege, 47 the prosecutor has sole discretion to determine
whether the witness's testimony is sufficiently "necessary to the public
interest" to justify a grant of immunity. 4  Should the prosecutor
decide that immunity is required, he applies to the district court in
which the proceeding is being held for an immunity order. 40  If the
application is complete, the order must issue.50
The prosecutor's power to grant immunity is tempered by a heavy
burden of proving in a subsequent prosecution of the immunized
witness that no use was made, directly or indirectly, of testimony that
was compelled by such a grant.51 His task is not easy, as it is not
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Allstate Mtge. Corp., 507 F.2d
492, 495 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); see 2 Nat'i
Comm'n on Reform of Fed. Crim. Law, Working Papers 1434 (1970) (under the
proposed statute, unless "sound and urgent reasons" exist, the witness has no right to
an immunity grant) [hereinafter cited as Working Papers].
46. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1156-
57 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
825); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78
n.13 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Fra-
ney), 620 F.2d 1086, 1094 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Ellis v.
United States, 416 F.2d 791, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Earl v. United States, 361
F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967); In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618, 625 (N.D. Ill.), vacated per curian on
other grounds, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979); see Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 432-34 (1956). A recent line of cases, however, suggests that in order to effect
the defendant's due process rights, the district court may grant defense witnesses
judicial immunity at trial at the behest of a criminal defendant. Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1980) (remand to determine if judicial immunity is
necessary); United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1979) (immu-
nity not granted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); United States v. Herman, 589
F.2d 1191, 1203-05 (3d Cir. 1978) (judicial immunity not justified because not raised
in district court or on appeal), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); cf. In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 597-98 (3d Cir. 1977) (judicial immunity granted to
effect speech or debate clause protection). For a brief discussion of this development,
see United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 772-75 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1077 (1981).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(2) (1976).
48. Id. § 6003(b)(1); see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1976).
50. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 820 (1978); Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 933 (1975); 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1976); see Working Papers, supra note 45,
at 1435.
51. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972); United States v.
Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305,
310-11 (8th Cir. 1973). The Kastigar Court broadly interpreted § 6002 to prohibit
"the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect [so
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limited to a mere negation of derivative use; rather, the prosecutor
must affirmatively prove the independence of his sources.52 Prosecu-
torial exposure to immunized grand jury testimony prior to the return
of the indictment taints the government's evidence.5 3  Although the
prosecutor may be able to show independent sources of evidence,
courts enforce this prohibition for fear that exposure to immunized
testimony will result in derivative use of such information. 5 4 Such use
could include "focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecu-
tion, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-
examination and otherwise generally planning trial strategy."'
The government's evidence may also be tainted through non-prose-
cutorial exposure. The government is barred from using evidence
given by an informant whose own sources were exposed to immunized
testimony. 56  Additionally, when the giving of immunized informa-
as to ensure] that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on
the witness." 406 U.S. at 453.
52. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972); United States v. Nemes,
555 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
460 (1972)); United States v. Seiffert, 463 F.2d 1089, 1092 (5th Cir. 1972). Prosecuto-
rial evidence ordinarily comes under judicial scrutiny at a pre-trial evidentiary or
"taint" hearing. United States v. First W. State Bank, 491 F.2d 780, 787 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). If more appropriate, however, the issue of the use
of evidence "tainted" by immunity may be considered during or after the proceed-
ings. United States v. De Diego, 511 F.2d 818, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see United
States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 308 (8th Cir. 1973).
53. United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 307-08 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974). In McDaniel, a witness
received automatic immunity before testifying at a state grand jury proceeding. 482
F.2d at 307. The United States Attorney requested and received copies of the tran-
scripts, unaware that the testimony -'as immunized. He read them overnight, re-
turning them the next morning. Id. McDaniel was tried and convicted in federal
court of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 656, 1005 (1976). 482 F.2d at 308. On appeal, the
circuit court affirmed the vacating of the convictions, holding that the government
was faced with a virtually insurmountable task of discharging its heavy obligation.
Id. at 312. Similarly, in Dornau. the court granted a motion to dismiss 15 counts of
an indictment because the prosecutor had read immunized testimony given at bank-
ruptcy proceedings before the grand jury returned the indictment. 359 F. Supp. at
686-87.
54. United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d
473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); see United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d
51, 55 (2d Cir. 1977).
55. United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973); accord Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972); United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51,
55 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)), rev'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
56. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469-70 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 51-55 (2d Cir. 1977). In Neines, the
court found that the government prosecutor had not discharged his burden of prov-
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tion by one witness contributes to the decision of another to testify, the
latter's evidence may be "derived" from the immunized testimony and
therefore be deemed unavailable for prosecutorial use. 5
7
If the prosecutor cannot establish that his evidence is independent
of the immunized testimony, that evidence will be suppressed. 5
When the prosecutor's case rests largely on tainted evidence, charges
against the accused may be dropped,5 or a conviction vacated. 0
ing independent sources when he merely showed that he had had no direct or indirect
access to immunized grand jury testimony. Id. at 54-55. The court reasoned that
"such a disclaimer does not preclude the possibility that someone who has seen the
compelled testimony was thereby led to evidence that was furnished to federal
investigators." Id. at 55.
57. United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1976). In Kurzer, the
court remanded for further consideration the question of whether Kurzer's immu-
nized testimony was the indirect source of evidence used by the prosecutor to indict
him. Id. at 517. Kurzer had testified, under a grant of § 6003 immunity, before a
federal grand jury that had returned an indictment against Steinman. Id. at 513.
Steinman was allowed to plead guilty to one count of a violation of 26 U.S.C. §
7206(1) (1976) in return for his cooperation with the government. 534 F.2d at 514.
Steinman then gave evidence that the federal prosecutor used to have Kurzer in-
dicted. Id. In remanding, the Second Circuit instructed the district court to inquire
into Steinman's motivation in testifying: "[S]ince Steinman's identity and potential
value as a witness were not discovered through Kurzer, the only way in which
Steinman's testimony could be derived, either directly or indirectly, from Kurzer's
information is if the giving of that information contributed to Steinman's decision to
testify. Steinman's motivation is thus directly relevant to the central question in this
case." Id. at 517.
58. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976);
Working Papers, supra note 45, at 1434-35. To bear his burden of proof, the
prosecutor can preserve evidence by sealing and filing it with the court. Goldberg v.
United States, 472 F.2d 513, 516 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Henderson, 406
F. Supp. 417, 425 (D. Del. 1975); Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prose-
cution and the Fifth Amendment: "Criminal Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A
Rational Accommodation?", 67 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 155, 162 (1976); Note,
Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Practices Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003,
14 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 275, 284 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Problems and Practices];
Standards for Exclusion, supra note 25, at 176-78. As a practical matter, however,
"little or no incriminating evidence is in the Government's possession prior to an
immunized witness' compelled disclosures .... Indeed, in many cases the United
States Attorney initiates investigation and prosecution of a given individual, com-
pletely unaware of the fact that the suspect has previously given immunized testi-
mony." Problems and Practices, supra, at 284-85; accord Thornburgh, supra, at 162-
63. For example, a problem may arise when the accused has received immunity
under a state law without the federal prosecutor's knowledge. United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1973).
59. United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); see United
States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1977); Goldberg v. Utlited States, 472
F.2d 513, 516 (2d Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Henderson, 406 F. Supp. 417,
421-22 (D. Del. 1975) (dismissal of indictment is not required even if obtained in
violation of the fifth amendment).
60. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleisehacker), 644 F.2d 70, 80
(2d Cir. 1981); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th Cir. 1973); see
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Given the prosecutor's heavy burden and the serious consequences of a
failure to meet it, any interference with the prosecutor's prerogative in
granting use-derivative use immunity should be carefully scrutinized.
Such interference occurs when a district court in a civil case compels
witnesses who have received immunity in a prior criminal proceeding
to respond over a fifth amendment claim to questions taken from their
immunized testimony."'
C. Recent Treatment by the Courts
In recent private antitrust suits, civil litigants have taken advantage
of federal prosecutorial resources by using court-released transcripts of
immunized grand jury testimony to depose witnesses.02 Despite the
witnesses' assertion of the fifth amendment privilege and the absence
of the prosecutor, some courts, upon review of such use of this infor-
mation, have compelled testimony.6 3  These courts have held that
when immunized testimony is the source of questions asked at civil
depositions, responsive answers are "derived" from immunized testi-
mony. 64 Because such testimony would be barred from prosecutorial
use in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the witness can be compelled
to answer.
65
For example, in In re Starkey, 66 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court order adjudging a witness in contempt for failure to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d
893, 903 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973).
61. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1155-
56 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
825); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1093-94
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); see In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1981).
62. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1147
& n.1 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
825); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 73 (2d
Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086,
1089 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); In re Starkey, 600
F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 1979).
63. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 77
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 104648 (8th Cir. 1979); see Little Rock
School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 705-06 (8th Cir. 1980); Patrick v. United
States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1975).
64. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 77
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1979); see Little Rock
School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1980); Patrick v. United
States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1975).
65. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
66. 600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979). The witness, Starkey, had testified under a §
6003 grant of immunity before a federal grand jury investigating price-fixing in the
Arkansas dairy industry. Id. at 1045. He asserted his fifth amendment privilege at
deposition in the ensuing civil action. Id. Many of the deposition questions were
taken verbatim from the immunized grand jury testimony. Id. at 1046. The trial
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respond to deposition questions. 67  The circuit court stated that the
district court's compulsion of deposition testimony did not constitute a
de facto grant of immunity.68 Rather, the court was merely fulfilling
its duty to determine the scope of an immunity grant.69 To preserve
the immunized nature of the deposition testimony, however, the
Starkey court ordered inquiry to be confined to "the same time,
geographical and substantive framework as the grand jury testi-
mony."'7 0  Similarly, the Second Circuit, in In re Corrugated Con-
tainer Antitrust Litigation (Fleischacker),71 approved the district
court's order compelling testimony, 72 reasoning that the prospective
determination of derived use was part of the district court's assessment
of the validity of a fifth amendment claim, a traditional function of
the court. 73 The Fleischacker court acknowledged, however, that if
deposition examination were to extend beyond that of the grand jury,
the exclusion of the resultant testimony in a subsequent criminal
proceeding would subvert government efforts to prosecute the wit-
hess.74 The court therefore modified the guidelines established by the
Starkey court for deposition inquiry, narrowing it to specific subjects
actually touched upon by questions found in the grand jury minutes.75
By validating prospective determinations of derived use, both the
Starkey and Fleischacker courts favored the interests of the civil liti-
gant at the expense of those of the witness and the government. Other
courts, however, indicate that the interests properly accommodated
by the immunity grant are those of the witness and the prosecutor.7 0
court had released the grand jury minutes upon determining that the secrecy of the
contents had already been breached. Id. at 1045.
67. Id. at 1048. The court of appeals reasoned that because the deposition
questions were based upon immunized grand jury testimony, the deposition testi-
mony would be tainted and therefore unavailable for the criminal prosecution of
Starkey. Id. at 1047.
68. Id. at 1047-48.
69. Id. at 1048.
70. Id.
71. 644 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1981). Fleischacker had testified before a federal grand
jury that had been investigating allegations of price-fixing in the corrugated con-
tainer industry. Id. at 72. In the ensuing civil action, private plaintiffs attempted to
depose him using questions taken from immunized grand jury testimony. Id. at 73.
The testimony had previously been released to the private plaintiffs. Id. Fleischacker
asserted his fifth amendment privilege at the deposition. Id. The circuit court af-
firmed the order of contempt as it related to those questions within the scope of
permissible inquiry. Id. at 80.
72. Id. at 75. The court held, as a matter of law, that when immunized testi-
mony is the source of questions asked in an ensuing civil proceeding, responses are
"derivatively immunized" and hence barred from prosecutorial use. Id. at 78.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 78-79.
75. Id. at 79.
76. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145,
1156-58 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No.
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These courts recognize that when testimony is compelled in civil suits,
the scope of statutory protection is impermissibly controlled by the
civil litigant who directs the questioning at deposition, and not by the
prosecutor, who has the sole discretion to issue the immunity.7
For this reason, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Corrugated Container
Anti-trust Litigation (Franey),78 declined to compel testimony. 0° The
court concluded that because a district court lacks competence in a
civil setting to make prospective determinations of derived use, such a
determination could not protect the witness.80 Rather, the court
stated, the prospective determination constituted an impermissible
judicial grant of immunity which, in turn, triggered the operation of
the exclusionary rule. This rule, not the prospective determination,
was the true source of the witness's protection."' The Seventh Circuit
adopted the rationale of the Franey decision in In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation (Conboy). 2  In addition, the court
81-825); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Francy), 620 F.2d 1086, 1093-
94 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
77. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1157
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1094 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
78. 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1102 (1981). Frane'
and Hopkins had been granted statutory immunity for testimony given before a
federal grand jury investigating price-fixing allegations in the corrugated container
industry. Id. at 1088. Although Franey did not appear before the grand jury, he
consented to an interview with the Department of Justice in return for a letter
promising that the interview information would not be used against him in any
subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. The government released the transcript of the
interview to the grand jury. Id. Later, both Franey and Hopkins testified at the
criminal trial of the indicted container corporations under additional grants of
immunity. Id. at 1089. During the criminal trial, purchasers of the containers filed a
private treble-damage action against the container manufacturers, some of which
had been indicted by the grand jury. Id. at 1088. The court ordered the grand jury
testimony released to the civil plaintiffs, who attempted to depose Franey and
Hopkins using questions taken verbatim from the transcript. Id. at 1089 n.2. Franey
and Hopkins, former employees of the defendant corporations, asserted their privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Id. at 1089. The district court held them in contempt
on the theory that their answers would be derived from their immunized grand jury
testimony and thus beyond prosecutorial reach. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
vacated the contempt orders. Id. at 1095.
79. Id. at 1093-95.
80. Id. at 1094.
81. Id.
82. 661 F.2d 1145, 1153 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825). The Circuit Court held that a deponent in a civil suit
could not be compelled to testify over a fifth amendment claim. 661 F.2d at 1147.
Writing for the majority, Judge Sprecher approved the Fifth Circuit opinion, agree-
ing that it was beyond the district court's powers to make a prospective determina-
tion of taint. Id. at 1153. Such a predetermination, he reasoned, would result in an
impermissible judicial grant of immunity. Id. at 1155-57. Alternatively, the deposi-
tion testimony could constitute an independent source of evidence upon which the
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indicated that a district court's compulsion of testimony in a civil suit
could result in a witness's loss of fifth amendment protection through
inadvertent waiver. 83 Such a loss could not be justified on the ground
of facilitating private discovery efforts. 84
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits correctly identify the issues underly-
ing the imbalance in the state-individual relationship created by judi-
cial control of immunity. These courts, however, fail to explain the
implications of these issues or to resolve them adequately. A proper
resolution of the issues demands an in-depth examination of the dis-
trict court's authority, when sitting as a civil court, to determine the
derived use of a prior immunity grant. Further, consideration must
also be given to the effect that such a determination has on the
interests of the prosecutor, the witness, and the civil litigant.
II. THE COURT'S PowER, IN A CIVIL SETTING,
TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF AN
IMMUNITY GRANT
Decisions that compel testimony based on a prospective determina-
tion of derived use rely on the traditional power of all courts to assess
fifth amendment claims.85  Given this power, these courts contend
that they are not creating immunity but are merely defining the scope
of the existing protection. 6 They, however, fail to recognize the
distinction between a court's authority to rule on a fifth amendment
claim and its ability to determine the scope of an immunity grant.
There is no basis for equating the civil court's ability to rule on a
fifth amendment plea with its authority to determine the scope of an
immunity grant. The presiding judge in all proceedings necessarily
has the power to evaluate a fifth amendment claim because the privi-
lege against self-incrimination may be raised in any proceeding. 1  To
government could base a criminal prosecution. Id. at 1155. Such testimony would
also expose the witness to charges of perjury and waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege. Id. at 1158. Finally, he suggested that the entire problem could be obvi-
ated by admitting the grand jury testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). Id. at
1158-59. Chief Judge Cummings dissented, finding that the majority interpreted "the
use immunity statute to afford only parlous and nugatory protection and then, of
necessity, to find such protection an inadequate substitute for Fifth Amendment
rights." Id. at 1160-61.
83. Id. at 1158.
84. See id. at 1159.
85. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1979); see In re
Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1095 (5th Cir.
1980) (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
86. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70,
78 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1979).
87. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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postpone assessment and compel testimony would result in the initial
loss of fifth amendment protection and the witness's testimony becom-
ing a part of the record of the proceedings. This testimony may
ultimately be excluded from prosecutorial use as erroneously com-
pelled. s8 Such information could also taint other evidence that the
government accumulates against the witness8 9 A squandering of
judicial and prosecutorial resources, therefore, occurs. 0 Alterna-
tively, were the claimant incorrectly permitted to stand on the privi-
lege, the court would confer upon the witness the power to arrest the
fact-finding process. 9' This result improperly provides the witness
with the power to use the shield of privilege as a sword against the
parties to the proceeding.9 2
Similar reasoning does not support the defining of the scope of
immunity in a civil proceeding. No imperatives of privilege or prose-
cutorial and judicial cost exist in the prospective evaluation of the
bounds of an immunity grant during a civil suit. The witness would
remain protected by asserting the fifth amendment.9 3 Moreover, only
88. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976); Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 79 (1973); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966); Adams v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954).
89. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972); United States v.
Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 460 (1972)); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 685, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev;d on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
90. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644
F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 969 (1973). If the prosecutor has based all or part of his ease against the
claimant on this testimony, the case will fall because of a determination that the
testimony was erroneously compelled. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
Further, derivative use of the testimony would be prohibited and would similarly
undermine the prosecutor's evidence. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.
(Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.
(Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78 n.13 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container
Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1102 (1981); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618, 624-25
(N.D. Ill.), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
Thus, the investigation, in whole or in part, will have been wasted. Similarly, an
evidentiary hearing at criminal trial could have been avoided had assessment been
made in the proceeding in which the fifth amendment was first asserted.
91. United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1976).
92. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir.
1979); see Backos v. United States, 82 F.R.D. 743, 745 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Duffy v.
Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1968); Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Pricate Civil Litigation: A Critical Analy-
sis, 39 Brooklyn L. Rev. 121, 149-51 (1972).
93. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1147-
48 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
10051982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
at the criminal trial is evaluation of the scope of immunity proper, as
it is only here that the witness may raise immunity as a bar to criminal
liability. 94 In the civil litigation, the perceived danger is not to the
witness, but to the civil litigant, in the possible loss of but one of
several sources of useful information. A civil court's attempt to
determine the scope of immunity, therefore, is not within the constitu-
tional grant given to all courts in determining a fifth amendment
claimA6 Rather, if the power to make a prospective determination of
taint in a civil proceeding exists, it must be found within the immu-
nity statute itself.
III. BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE PROSECUTOR,
WITNESS AND CIVIL LITIGANT
A. The Prosecutor's Interest in Facilitating
Law Enforcement
Immunity is a "rational accommodation between the imperatives of
the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel
citizens to testify. '9 7 This accommodation is referred to as the immu-
nity bargain. In exchange for the witness's testimony, the prosecutor
will not use the testimony or its fruits against the witness in any
criminal proceeding.98
825); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1091-92,
1094 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
94. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp. 846, 857-58 (E.D.
Pa. 1976); cf. In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086,
1093 (5th Cir. 1980) (because the government must bear the burden of proof on the
issue of taint, the issue was not properly raised where the government was not a
party), cert. denied, 4,9 U.S. 1102 (1981).
95. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1159
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825).
Civil plaintiffs may uncover the desired information through general discovery,
including testimony from witnesses other than those who had previously received
immunity.
96. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
97. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972); accord United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 135 (1980); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
98. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568
F.2d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v.
Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); Senate
Hearings, supra note 42, at 285-86 (statement of Rep. Poff). The term "bargain" is
something of a misnomer in the sense that there is no element of negotiation. Once
conferred, the party granted immunity has no choice but to accept it. United States
v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968); United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975).
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In enacting sections 6002 and 6003 of the Witness Immunity Act,
Congress clearly vested the granting and control of immunity in the
Attorney General and his delegates. 99 Prosecutorial grants of statu-
tory immunity are designed to be a part of a comprehensive scheme of
law enforcement.100 The legislative history of the Witness Immunity
Act states:
In a precise sense there is no "right" to a grant of immunity. The
starting point is a witness plea of the fifth amendment. At that
point, if the government wishes to go forward with the investiga-
tion it must make a determination in these terms: Is the public need
for the particular testimony ... in question so great as to override
the social cost of granting immunity and thereby possibly pardon-
ing a person who has violated the criminal lawv? Such a calculation
can be made only by a person familiar with the total range of law
enforcement policies which would be affected by an immunity
grant, and not by one familiar only with the asserted public need in
the particular case.'01
Courts compelling testimony, after determining that it is derivatively
immunized, claim that such action does not improperly remove the
control of immunity from the prosecutor.'02 These courts, however,
ignore the true effect that their holdings have on the intended scope of
a prosecutor's immunity grant.
99. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1157
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78 n. 13 (2d
Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franev), 620 F.2d 1086,
1092 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d
1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1979); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1976).
100. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1969); H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1970); Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 282 (statement of Rep.
Poff).
101. Working Papers, supra note 45, at 1433. This policy has received judicial
recognition. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir.) ("Once the bar of the
privilege against self-incrimination has been raised .... the decision whether to
confer immunity in order to facilitate the government's investigation is the product of
the balancing of the public need for the particular testimony . . .against the social
cost of granting immunity .... Therefore, the relative importance ... to federal
law enforcement interests is a judgmental rather than a legal determination, one
remaining wholly within the competence of the appropriate executive officials, i.e.,
the United States Attorney with the approval of the Attorney General or his dele-
gate."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v. Dunn, 577 F.2d 119, 126
(10th Cir. 1978) ("Immunity statutes are . . . ordinarily for the benefit of the gov-
emnent, designed to effectively serve the compelling needs of the criminal justice
system by preventing a substantial avoidance of prosecution and penalty."), rev'd on
other grounds, 442 U.S. 100 (1979).
102. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1979).
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The danger of an impermissible judicial creation of immunity is
evidenced by the expansive range of deposition inquiry permitted by
courts compelling testimony. 10 3  By failing to limit examination to
questions taken verbatim from the immunized grand jury testimony,
these courts endow the civil litigant with the power to enlarge the
original deposition grant, a prerogative attaching solely to the prose-
cutor. 10 4  The Starkey approach of permitting questioning as to the
subjects within "the same time, geographical and substantive frame-
work as the grand jury"105 and the even more restrictive Fleischacker
guidelines permitting inquiry into "specific subjects that actually were
touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the immu-
nized testimony,"'013 allow civil plaintiffs to enter with impunity areas
which the prosecutor may have declined to explore.107  As a result,
subjects that the prosecutor had purposefully left untouched for future
discovery may become tainted. The civil litigant has no incentive to
confine his questioning in order to maintain the prosecutor's re-
serve; ' 08 indeed, with judicial sanction to go further, there is no need
for restraint. Broad-ranging testimony is certain to render impossible
the prosecutor's burden of proving that any evidence he may have
against the witness is from a legitimate source, wholly independent of
the witness's immunized testimony. 0 9
103. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 79
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1979).
104. See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 820 (1978); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
105. In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1979).
106. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 79
(2d Cir. 1981).
107. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618, 629 (N.D. I11.),
vacated per curiam on other grounds, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979). Significantly,
one court that compelled testimony recognized this danger and tried to eliminate It
by restricting the scope of permissible inquiry. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1981).
108. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70,
79 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1157
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825),
see In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618, 629 (N.D. Ill.), vacated
per curiam on other grounds, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979). The burden is increased
in two ways. First, there is the additional volume of immunized testimony that has
been rendered unusable. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleis-
chacker), 644 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.
1979). Second, it is likely that the informants who are in a position to provide the
government with evidence against the witness will also be sources of information to
the civil plaintiffs and, through their involvement in the civil litigation, may be
exposed to the immunized testimony. Because evidence may be tainted by virtue of
the fact that "someone who has seen the (immunized] testimony was . . . led to
evidence that was furnished to federal investigators," the government may be fore-
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By authorizing an expansive inquiry, the courts endow the civil
plaintiff with power to place all "subjects" touched upon at the grand
jury beyond the reach of the federal prosecutor. This result strikes at
the heart of the Witness Immunity Act, the purpose of which was to
narrow the witness's historically broad immunity protection.'1' Judi-
cially-sanctioned private examination instead confers a form of sub-
ject matter immunity that marks a regression toward transactional
witness protection."'
Moreover, this problem would not be resolved by stricter standards
of deposition inquiry. Even when a court limits inquiry to questions
taken from the immunized grand jury testimony, the original scope of
immunity is expanded by the witness's answers to those questions." 2
Depending upon the court's application of the after-the-fact exclusion-
ary rule, the operation of that rule may protect the witness from
prosecution based on compelled deposition testimony that expands
upon that of the grand jury.113 In such a case, the witness would have
no incentive to refrain from testifying at greater length when ques-
tioned by the civil litigant, as the more extensive the witness's re-
sponses, the greater his protection will be." 4  By compelling testi-
mony, the court necessarily creates immunity and thus improperly
removes control of immunity from the prosecutor."15
closed from the use of information supplied by those involved in the civil suit. United
States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1977): accord Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 470 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Thornburgh, supra note 58, at
163.
110. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454 (1972); Working Papers, supra
note 45, at 1422-23; see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 122-23 (1980).
111. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1157
n.17 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
825); see In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086,
1093-94 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); 1n re Folding Carton
Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618, 629 (N.D. Ill.), vacated per curian on other
grounds, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
112. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618, 629 (N.D. Ill.),
vacated per curiam on other grounds, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979): see In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1155-57 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825). Another
danger exists if the witness is examined during a subsequent civil trial. Even in the
unlikely event that the witness's responses to verbatim questions do not extend
beyond his earlier testimony, cross examination may necessarily expand the scope of
that testimony and, hence, the witness's immunity. See Brown v. United States, 356
U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958): Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 (1912): United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 907 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 1966).
113. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
114. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70,
79 (2d Cir. 1981); Thornburgh, supra note 58, at 156.
115. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1156-
57 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
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B. The Witness's Fear of Waiver
In addition to creating difficulties for the prosecutor, a civil court's
determination of the scope of immunity creates a hazard of waiver for
the witness. Ordinarily, once immunity issues, the witness may re-
spond to questions posed by the prosecutor without fear of waiver. 1"0
The witness is assured that responses made during his examination
will be immunized because the prosecutor has sole authority to deter-
mine whether immunity shall be granted and what its limits will
be. 11 7 The prosecutor's questions and the witness's responses shape
the ultimate scope of the immunity; therefore, no difficulty concern-
ing the parameters of the protection arises in a subsequent criminal
proceeding. I"
When a civil court compels the witness to speak, however, a waiver
problem arises because control of immunity is no longer solely within
the hands of the prosecutor. Although the initial grant of immunity
has been authorized by the government," 9 the determination of the
scope is shared by the prosecutor, the civil court, in compelling testi-
mony,12 0 and the civil litigant, in framing the questions to be
asked. 121 Because the scope of immunity is twice-defined, once by the
prosecutor and once by both the civil court and civil litigant, a ques-
tion concerning the true parameters of the protection will arise in the
ensuing criminal proceeding.
825); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1093-94
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d
791, 795-96 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.
(Fleischaeker), 644 F.2d 70, 78 n.13 (2d Cir. 1981).
116. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
118. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 541 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 820 (1978); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972); United
States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 309 (8th Cir. 1973); Thornburgh, supra note 58,
at 156.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976); see In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.
(Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.
(Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust
Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086, 1088 (5th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102
(1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1979).
120. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145,
1157 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
825); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 79 (2d
Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086,
1093 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); In re Starkey, 600 F.2d
1043, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1979).
121. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145,
1157 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-
825); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 79 (2d
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A criminal court may adopt the enlarged immunity conferred by
the civil court, or alternatively, the court could accept the prosecutor's
narrower version as encompassing the totality of immunized testi-
mony. Between the two extremes lie numerous options, an), one of
which the court could recognize. If the criminal court adopts any
version of immunity protection other than that of the civil court, the
witness's testimony will be admissible against him, as he will be
deemed to have waived the privilege.122
A witness, therefore, cannot be certain that even his answers to
verbatim questions will be deemed immunized by the district court in
a subsequent criminal proceeding. The risk of waiver is further in-
creased when the civil court permits nonverbatim questions. It may
then be difficult for the witness to determine whether the immunized
grand jury testimony was the source of these questions. 2 3 Absent the
witness's claim of privilege as to each and every question propounded,
inadvertent waiver may occur.12 4 Answers to deposition questions of
ambiguous origin may be deemed not to have been compelled and
hence admissible by the criminal court. 2 5 Rather than ensuring that
Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Frany). 620 F.2d 1086,
1093 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1102 (1981): In re Starkev. 600 F.2d
1043, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1979).
122. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1158
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
see In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 79 n.14
(2d Cir. 1981).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Bursey, 466 F.2d 1059, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1972)
(questions relating to the training of Black Panthers for violent action and the secrecy
of their activities are within the scope of immunity for information concerning
violent acts against the President, but not questions relating to plans to kill federal or
state judges); Presser v. United States, 284 F.2d 233, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (witness at
Senate hearing, having testified that he had complied with a subpoena duces tecuin
to the best of his ability, had waived the privilege in refusing to answer a question as
to whether he had destroyed pertinent records); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384,
388 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (in an action in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
had defrauded him of $150,000, the defendant's acknowledgement that he had given
promissory notes to the plaintiff upon receipt of the "'loans," and his disclaimer of any
debt owed to the plaintiff, did not waive the privilege as to questions regarding the
defendant's actions in concert with others to defraud).
124. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1951) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1158
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
United States v. O'Henry's Film Works, Inc., 598 F.2d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1979). A
witness may waive the privilege without subjective intent to do so. See supra notes
27-29 and accompanying text.
125. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1158
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825);
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 79 n.14 (2d
Cir. 1981).
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a witness's deposition testimony will be immunized, prospective deter-
minations of derived use may have the contrary effect of increasing
the risk of loss of fifth amendment protection.
C. Protecting the Civil Litigant
Courts that refuse to predetermine the scope of immunity properly
shield the interests of the witness and the prosecutor, the parties
whom the immunity statute and the fifth amendment were designed
to protect.1 26  This position, though preserving the immunity bar-
gain,127 forecloses the civil litigant's access to the testimony of the
witness. 28 To the extent that the civil litigant serves as a "private
attorney general," 12 9 encouraged by Congress and the courts to prose-
cute private antitrust suits as a means of effectuating federal antitrust
policy, he may have a limited entitlement to this information. 3 0 It is
the government, however, that has the primary responsibility of en-
forcing the antitrust laws.' 3' The interest of the civil litigant cannot
overcome the strong considerations that mandate strict governmental
control of immunity. 32
Although the civil litigant's interest cannot be promoted by a court's
prospective determination of taint, his interests may be accommo-
dated by making an application to the Department of Justice for a
new grant of statutory immunity. 33  Neither the immunity statute
126. See supra pt. 1.
127. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
128. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Conboy), 661 F.2d 1145, 1159
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982) (No. 81-825).
129. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147
(1968) (Fortes, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 138-39; Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976, 981 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., 475 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Rutherford v. United States, 365 F.2d 353,
356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
131. United States v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954); United States v. Dunham
Concrete Prods., Inc., 475 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832
(1973); see Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1147-48 (6th Cir. 1975).
132. See supra pt. [II(A), (B).
133. Brief for the United States of America as Ainicus Curiae at 24(d) n.20, In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1981),
(appended to Reply Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, In re
Corrugated Container Anti-trust Litig. (Franey), 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981)). Sanford Litvack, former Assistant Attorney
General in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, stated that the power
of the government to grant immunity is not limited to cases in which the United
States is a party. Id.; see Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 702-
03 (8th Cir. 1980). But see In re Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1979) (federal
prosecutor refused to grant immunity on the ground that the federal government was
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itself nor its underlying policies prohibit such a grant.134 This proce-
dure would promote the interests of the private attorney general and
allow the government to maintain control of the scope of immunity,
as intended by the statute.
CONCLUSION
In determining the scope of a prior grant of immunity, civil courts
subvert the protective aspect of the federal immunity statute. Com-
pulsion of testimony disturbs the accommodation of interests achieved
by the statute. Neither the witness nor the prosecutor is properly
shielded. The witness faces a possible waiver of protection; the prose-
cutor is likely to lose the use of evidence from whatever source he may
have against the witness. The civil court has thus taken the shield of
immunity away from the witness and the prosecutor, and has placed
it in the hands of the civil plaintiff, who wields it as a sword against
the two parties for whose benefit it was created.
Hilary Anne Zealand
not a party to the case); Likelihood of Prosecution, supra note 9, at 679 n.43
(apparently, the government must be a party to the action before a grant of immu-
nity can issue).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976); see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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